We investigate the solvability of the reverse Stackelberg game. Here, a leader player acts first by presenting a leader function that maps the follower decision space into the leader decision space. Subsequently, the follower acts by determining his optimal decision variable. Such a game setting can be adopted within a multi-level optimization approach for large-scale control problems like road tolling. However, due to the complexity of the general game, results often rely on specific examples. As a starting point towards developing a systematic approach for the use of reverse Stackelberg games in control, a characterization of cases is given in which the desired leader equilibrium can be achieved by an affine leader function. Here, we focus on the single-leader single-follower deterministic, static (one-shot) case. This characterization follows a geometric approach and extends the special cases considered in the existing literature to also incorporate the more general case in which nonconvex and nonsmooth sublevel sets apply.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of large-scale control problems, smart optimization methods have to be implemented in order to obtain a good performance in an acceptable time frame. Whereas a centralized approach is intractable in largescale networks, a decentralized method generally yields an insufficient performance. A distributed control approach may work efficiently, yet in networks where a natural division in levels applies, e.g., due to the operation of controllers on different time scales and sizes of a network, a multi-level approach may fit better (Scattolini, 2009) .
In multi-level control, a leader-follower game structure can be applied as a means to structure and facilitate the problem solving. The reverse Stackelberg game is such a game (Ho et al., 1981) , also known in the control community under the concept 'incentives' and more recently as inverse Stackelberg game (Olsder, 2009) . Whereas the original Stackelberg game considers a hierarchical framework in which leader and follower player act sequentially by presenting their decision variable values (von Stackelberg, 1934) , in the reverse Stackelberg game the leader action is of a different type. Here, the leader acts first by presenting a mapping of the follower decision space into the leader decision space, after which the follower still acts by determining his optimal decision variable.
Since the 1970s, several results have been obtained on both static and dynamic (open and closed-loop or feedback) Stackelberg games (Simaan and Cruz, Jr., 1973; Tolwinski, 1981) and reverse Stackelberg games (Li et al., 2002) , also considering cases with uncertainty (Başar, 1984; Cansever and Başar, 1985b,a) . Other extensions include partial information (Zheng and Başar, 1982) and different time scales of operation (Salman and Cruz, Jr., 1983) . More recently, results in Stackelberg games have included switching positions of leader and follower (Nie, 2010; Başar et al., 2010) . However, it should be emphasized that the game is complex due to e.g., the composed functions involved (Olsder, 2009) . Nonetheless, the game has been applied to network pricing (Shen and Başar, 2007) and electricity pricing as well as to road tolling problems (Staňková et al., 2009 ). Still, current research mostly remains restricted to the special case of an affine leader function in applications with convex, quadratic cost functions and, in the dynamic case, linear state equations (Ehtamo and Hämäläinen, 1985) . In particular, in Zheng and Başar (1982) some conditions were developed for the existence of an optimal affine leader function, arguing that the class of problems with a differentiable and strictly convex follower objective function is sufficiently large. Nonetheless, reallife control problems occur with many different structures.
In the current paper, necessary and sufficient conditions are therefore presented for the existence of an affine leader function that returns the desired reverse Stackelberg equilibrium. Here, existing sufficiency results for the strictly convex case are extended, considering also nondifferentiable objective functions and sublevel sets. Moreover, the convexity requirement of the follower's objective function is relaxed and later on a constrained decision space is considered. The extension is not so trivial, as will be illustrated by some examples. While this extension is only a first step in relaxing the assumptions made so far, it aims towards extending and developing a structured approach for solving more general subclasses of this complex game.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After the definition of the reverse Stackelberg game in Section 2, some preliminary notation and assumptions are stated. In Section 3 the affine leader function structure is presented, after which the existence results for an optimal affine leader function for a convex respectively nonconvex sublevel set are presented in Section 4 and 5. Section 6 includes a brief analysis of the constrained case and the paper is concluded in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES

The Reverse Stackelberg Game
In the following definition of the reverse Stackelberg game, we assume that the leader seeks to achieve a unique global optimum (u
The problem then becomes for the leader to determine an optimal leader function γ L : Ω F → Ω L that leads to this equilibrium. In the case of multiple optima, the leader may choose any of them as the desired solution. Further, leader and follower objective functions are denoted J · : Ω L × Ω F → R and Γ L denotes the class of admissible leader functions in a particular game context.
To find:
arg min
In other words, the leader should construct her function γ L such that it passes through her desired optimum but such that it does not touch other points in the sublevel set As a first step in our analysis of the problem, we like to know under what conditions the leader is able to induce the follower to choose the input u d F and thus reach the desired solution. The property of a particular equilibrium to be feasible for an instance of the reverse Stackelberg game is known as incentive compatibility . In this paper, linear incentive compatibility will be considered, i.e., regarding an affine structure of γ L .
Notation
The reader is assumed to be familiar with some concepts occurring in convex analysis and geometry, such as hyperplanes and strictly convex functions and sets (see e.g., Auslender and Teboulle (2003) ; Rockafellar (1970) ; Dattorro (2005) ). In addition, we will use the following definitions:
• Π X (x) denotes a supporting hyperplane to the set X at the point x ∈ X.
• As in Auslender and Teboulle (2003) a set X is an affine subspace if y, z ∈ X ⇐⇒ αy + (1 − α)z ∈ X∀α ∈ R.
• As in Dattorro (2005) , a vertex point or exposed point v of a convex set X is defined as a point in its closureX that intersects with a strictly supporting hyperplane. Similarly, a pointx in the closure of a nonconvex setX is a vertex point if there exists a neighborhood ofx, N (x), such thatx intersects with a strictly supporting hyperplane to N (x).
• The projection of a vector v on the vector x is denoted proj x (v). The projection of the set P ⊆ R n onto the space X = R m , m ≤ n is denoted proj X (P ).
• By {0} nL × Ω F we denote the decision space in which the leader components are taken to be zero.
• A generalized gradient ∂f (x) of a locally Lipschitz continuous function f : R n → R at x is defined as follows:
with Ω f being the set of points where f is nondifferentiable and where no limit lim m→∞ ∇f (x m ) exists (Clarke, 1983) . By V(X(x)) we denote the generalized normal to the set X at the point x ∈X, defined as the set of normal vectors to the possible tangent hyperspaces to X at x.
Assumptions
The first assumption is taken from the literature on Stackelberg games, e.g., Zheng and Başar (1982) ; Başar and Olsder (1999) , and is required for convexity of J F and Λ d . Assumption [A.2] is a less restricted case of taking J F and therefore also Λ d to be strictly convex, as done in Zheng and Başar (1982) . Note that [A.2] is automatically satisfied if it holds that J F is a convex or quasiconvex function. Assumption [A.3] is necessary in order to use the concept of a supporting hyperplane and it is an accepted assumption in many control applications (Åström and Wittenmark, 1997) . Finally, the special case excluded by assumption [A.4] 
is automatically optimal for the follower.
AN AFFINE LEADER FUNCTION
In the following we assume an affine leader function
with B a linear operator mapping Ω F → Ω L , represented by an n L ×n F matrix in the considered finite-dimensional case.
Recall from the definition of the reverse Stackelberg game that the variable u d F is optimal for the follower if and only
Recall also that a supporting hyperplane intersects solely with points on the boundary of a set. Therefore, in the following results we make use of the latter concept, requiring γ L to lie on a strictly supporting hyperplane
Here, γ L can be described as an affine hyperspace of dimension n L , i.e., it is a subset of an (n L + n F − 1)-dimensional hyperplane.
From now on, we denote by A L the set of affine relations through (u
Note that this construction is necessary in order to be able to work with the function
For the sake of clarity, we now provide a high-level summary of the results presented in the remainder.
Overview of Results
• Unconstrained decision space
In the following, results of Zheng and Başar (1982) are extended into a stronger, necessary and sufficient condition (Theorem 5) and subsequently formulated for the case of a nonsmooth sublevel set (Theorem 7). Some special cases are further pointed out in several remarks. It should be noted that when relaxing the strict convexity of the follower objective function, the desired leader equilibrium is not automatically a boundary point of the sublevel set. Exclusion of this case prevents the current theory from being generally applicable.
Lemma 1 and 2 required for the remainder of the analysis follow automatically from the supporting hyperplane theorem (e.g., Theorem 11.6 in Rockafellar (1970) ) and the definition of a strictly supporting hyperplane.
Lemma 2. Assume Λ d to be convex and assume Λ d to be locally strictly convex at (u
Remark 3. There exists a more general class of sublevel sets Λ d that are not necessarily locally strictly convex at the equilibria (u
Here we refer to the vertex points of Λ d ; Lemma 2 can thus be extended to include sets Λ d for which (u 
that is not strictly supporting.
vexity of Λ d there does exist a supporting hyperplanẽ 
Proof. From Lemma 1 and 2 it follows that there exists an affine α
Under the use of a leader function associated with α (Ω L ) = Ω F to hold it is necessary and sufficient that
, which is unique and hence the supporting hyperplane
it is a tangent hyperplane corresponding to the equation ∇
will be defined only by the first term of (6), i.e., ∇ T ∇f (x) ∀x, y ∈ dom(f ), x = y.
It follows that the normal vector defining the hyperplane
is parallel to the decision space Ω F , i.e., the hyperplane is orthogonal to {0} nL × Ω F . Therefore,
for which no optimal affine leader function exists. 
Proof. Refer to the proof of Theorem 5 in combination with Remark 3 for the existence of an optimal affine α
. This property can be proven to be necessary and sufficient along the lines of the proof of Theorem 5 regarding
Remark 8. Consider the case described in Theorem 7 and in addition, let both inputs be scalar (n F = 1, n L = 1). For this special case an affine
, a supporting hyperplane to Λ d will not be a unique (tangent) hyperplane. By both the convexity of Λ d and by (u
Therefore there must exist an alternative normal vector defining the hyperplane
In the current section, we show that in case the sublevel set Λ d is allowed to be nonconvex, the results presented for the convex case may still apply if we consider the convex hull of Λ d . Further, for the specific case where u L is a scalar, a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for the use of an affine leader function. However, for n L > 1 the concept of a supporting hyperplane used so far may be too restrictive, as will finally be considered in Proposition 14.
Proof. By definition of a convex hull, a supporting hy- 
is a boundary point of conv(Λ d ) and thus also of Λ d (Rockafellar (1970) , Theorem 11.6). Now, by definition, a vertex of conv(Λ d ) is such a boundary point.
For an intersection of Π
Lemma 10. Assume there exists a strictly supporting hyperplane
Proof. Only in case of u L scalar the dimension of a hyperplane Π Λ d , i.e., (n L + n F ) − 1, equals the number of independent variables, n F , of an affine leader function. If there exists a strictly supporting hyperplane
, it follows that this plane coincides with α
Lemma 10 implies that for n L > 1 and for Fig. 3 . Example of an optimal affine leader function γ L not lying on a supporting hyperplane
separating the full (n F + n L )-dimensional decision space is generally too restrictive for the existence of an optimal affine leader function. This applies to e.g., the case where Figure 3 . Still, it is necessary that coverage of Ω F is achieved by an affine
. Hence, instead of using the supporting hyperplane concept, a condition will be developed based on a tangent hyperplane (Proposition 14). However, we first extend the results of Theorem 5 and 7 to the cases with respectively Λ d nonconvex and nondifferentiable at (u
as shown in Lemma 10. Further, by Lemma 9, a sup-
. For the remainder of the proof we refer to the proof of Theorem 5 where Λ d should be replaced by conv(Λ d ), and where Lemma 9 is used as the nonconvex equivalent to Lemma 2.
In the following proposition, differentiability of J F is again relaxed and locally strict convexity of 
Hence by Lemma 9 a supporting hyperplane exists that in addition contains only (u
For the remainder of the proof we refer to the proof of Theorem 7 where Λ d should be replaced by conv(Λ d ), and where the proof of Proposition 11 is used as the nonconvex equivalent to Theorem 5.
n
Proof. Refer to the proof of Theorem 7, but where the convex set Λ d is replaced by conv(Λ d ). As discussed in Lemma 9, since (u
Proof. First note that because α L ∈ A L is of the same dimension as the tangent, affine subspace Π
Additionally, given that an optimal affine α L ∈ A L exists, in order for α L to be a mapping Ω F → Ω L it is sufficient and necessary that proj 
CONSTRAINED DECISION SPACE
So far the unbounded case is considered and conditions have been provided under which an optimal affine leader function exists that leads to the desired equilibrium. In the constrained case however, the complexity arises that additionally 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
We have studied necessary and sufficient conditions under which an affine leader function can solve the singleleader single-follower deterministic static reverse Stackelberg game to optimality for a particular desired leader equilibrium. While in the literature the focus is on a special class of problems, we have developed more general conditions and extended the existing results by considering nonconvex and nonsmooth sublevel sets. These conditions can be used for further derivation of an optimal leader function and they therefore provide a basic step towards developing a systematic approach for solving more general subclasses of the complex reverse Stackelberg game.
Topics for future research include the investigation of a more diverse class of nonlinear leader functions, e.g., piecewise-affine and smooth (piecewise) polynomial structures, and the formulation of sufficient conditions in case of a constrained decision space. The development of numerical derivation methods for the leader function could facilitate the formulation of such conditions. Here, the development of a tractable solution approach of the reverse Stackelberg game will be a focal point of continued research, to-be-applied in applications like road tolling.
